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Abstract—Electric power distribution systems are evolving 
toward more intelligent models allowing distribution 
organizations to have a perspective on how consumption is 
happening. However, these systems may allow for violation of 
consumer privacy, as they can identify the equipment in use, 
allowing for profiling of user activities. This work addresses the 
need to develop a mechanism to protect privacy, and presents an 
option for creating this protection for individual electric power 
consumer units through intermediate encryption of readings 
from these individual units, allowing suppliers access not to 
individual readings, but sum of their total. 
Index Terms —smart grid; smart metering; homomorphic 
encryption; privacy 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Electric power generation, transportation and distribution 
systems have undergone, together with electric power 
consumption, changes in recent years due to the need to 
modernize the vast Power Grid (PG). According to [1], some 
8% of all electric power produced is lost along transmission 
lines while another 20% of transmission and distribution 
capacity is destined for meeting demand at peak consumption, 
which comprises approximately 5% of the total transport time 
of this energy.  
The evolution of the electric power system is called Smart 
Grid (SG) which, according to [2], is modern infrastructure 
applied throughout the electric power grid to improve 
efficiency, reliability and safety as well as smoothly integrate 
renewable and alternative energy sources through automated 
control and communication technology. According to [3], the 
SG is composed of a network of computers and powerful 
computers to monitor and manage the generation, transport, 
distribution and use of electric power.  
The definition of Smart Grid according to the European 
regulatory council is “[...] an electricity network that can cost-
efficiently integrate the behavior and actions of all users 
connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both 
– in order to ensure economically-efficient, sustainable power 
systems with low losses and high levels of quality and security 
of supply and safety” [4]. According to the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology's conceptual model, the Smart Grid 
consists of seven domains: Mass Generation, Transmission, 
Distribution, Client, Markets, Service Providers and 
Operations. In order to interconnect all these domains, the 
communication network should be highly distributed and 
hierarchical, as affirmed by [5].  
A system this size must have the capacity to automatically 
recuperate itself after a disturbance, provide energy without 
oscillations, failures or quality/reliability problems, should 
support alternative and renewable energy sources (solar, wind, 
tide, etc...) as well as maintain energy storage systems, have 
high monitoring standards and constant measurement 
throughout the entire system, while allowing users/consumers 
to take advantage of these features (see [6],[7],[8]and[9]). 
If we follow these lines of thought, we can aim toward the 
possibility of suppliers being able to use information from 
periodical Smart Meter readings to control electric power 
demand.  
The use of Smart Meters in electric power distribution 
systems gives rise to a new paradigm in the context of 
consumption analysis of consumer units, especially homes. The 
ease of measurement introduced by this system can, to a certain 
point, instantly determine consumption1 at each consumer unit. 
However this places privacy into check, as it is possible to 
determine what happens inside each unit through analysis of 
the collected data. Electricity Suppliers (represented as ES in 
this paper) may need to obtain instant consumption for their 
demand control and planning.  
The challenge of maintaining privacy while having access 
to this information on demand engenders some solutions. 
Given that the ES need information on demand for a group of 
consumer units as opposed to single units, the sum of the 
consumption will meet their needs. In this paper, we present a 
possible approach to address consumer unit privacy issues 
while meeting ES needs for demand. The solution is based on 
the work presented by [10]. 
II. APPROACH  
In [10], we are presented with a structure where Smart 
Meters (SM) communicate directly with ES as shown in Fig. 1, 
together with the mathematical calculations involved.  
 
Fig.1: Basic approach – from [10] 
                                                           
1
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intervals of time like fractions of an hour. 
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The approach explained by [10] assumes that the ES will 
receive a reading eij  from the Smart MeterSMifor a period 
jencrypted with a keykij . This key is encrypted and used only 
once and renewed for each reading received by the ES, which 
is unable to decipher the message but will be able to decrypt 
the sum of specific group's measurements. This is made 
possible by the process described below.  
We used two graphic symbols here; the first ⨁, is used to 
denote a addition operation on simple texts, in this case 
individual readings for each SM, and the second,⨂, represents 
an addition operation on encrypted values.  
1. The ES receives periodical readings 𝑒𝑖𝑗 encrypted with 
the key 𝑘𝑖𝑗 , i.e., 
𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗  𝑒𝑖𝑗  ,∀ 𝑖, 𝑗 
 Ek1j e1j , Ek2j e2j ,… , Eknj  enj  
2. The ES performs the operation ⨂𝑖𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗 (𝑒𝑖𝑗 ) that will be 
equal to the equation defined by 𝐸𝐾(⨁𝑖𝑒𝑖𝑗 )where 𝐾 =
𝑓(𝑘1𝑗 ,𝑘2𝑗 ,… ,𝑘𝑛𝑗 ), or: 
⨂i=1
n Ekij  eij = EK ⨁i=1
n eij  
3. The key 𝐾 is transmitted one time to the ES. 
III. GROUPING 
We assume that the SMs are grouped according to the 
interests of the ES such as, for example, all the consumer units 
in a given building, on a street, or all the units served by a 
particular distribution transformer.  
We can assume that all the SMs in one common group can 
communicate among themselves, regardless which physical 
means is used to do so. One SM will periodically assume the 
role of Local Concentrator (LC), which is assigned at random. 
The LC's job is to generate the key K and manage the group.  
This work also assumes that the security requirements for 
message exchanges between the SM and ES are met by means 
of an authentication mechanism, therein guaranteeing the 
establishment of a secure channel. This begins with the 
establishment of a TLS connection in which the server is 
authenticated through a certificate. The server can be the ES or 
the LC.  
IV. AGGREGATION KEYS 
According to the CMT model presented by [11], whose 
algorithm is shown inTable 1, the cryptography keys should be 
changed constantly. The LC receives the keys kij  during the 
first period of measurement (therefore j = 1) from all SMs in 
the group, aggregates these keys and sends their sum to the ES 
via a secure channel.  
TABLE 1CASTELLUCCIA, MYKLETUN, TSUDIK (CMT) ALGORITHM 
Encryption 𝑀𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑚 ∈  0,𝑀 − 1,   
𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑙𝑦 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑘𝑒𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑚 
𝑘 ∈  0,𝑀 − 1  
𝑐 =  𝑚 + 𝑘  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 
 
Decryption 𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐,𝑘,𝑀 = 𝑐 − 𝑘  𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀  
 
Aggregation 𝐿𝑒𝑡 𝑐1 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚1 ,𝑘1 ,𝑀  𝑎𝑛𝑑 
𝑐2 = 𝐸𝑛𝑐 𝑚2 , 𝑘2 ,𝑀  
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑘 = 𝑘1 + 𝑘2 , 
𝐷𝑒𝑐 𝑐1 + 𝑐2 ,𝑘,𝑀 = 𝑚1 + 𝑚2 
 
 
This process will be repeated every time there is a change 
in system topology, in other words, a new SM in the group, an 
SM that leaves the group (even if temporarily, which happens 
in the case of communication failure). This process will also be 
carried out every time the LC is changed. This model is shown 
mathematically in (2). 
K = f k11 , k21 ,… , kn1 = ⨁i=1
n ki1 =  ki1
n
i=1  (2) 
In order to maintain the value of K constant, the kij  values 
must have a relationship. To guarantee this, the LC organizes 
the SMs in the group with a virtual ring where one SM sends a 
value δij  to its successor. 
In Error! Reference source not found.is a schematic 
representation of how this ring works. It should be mentioned 
here that any of the SMs may assume the role of LC, 
represented in this figure as 𝑆𝑀𝑚 . The value δij  is randomly 
generated each time and denominated by differential iterative 
encryption key.  
Each SM generates a value δij which is sent to the next SM 
in the virtual ring and when it has these values the encryption 
key is assembled. This way, each encrypted key is defined 
according to (3). The LC is responsible for determining the 
successors of each SM.  
 kij = ki1 − δij + δi−1,j (3) 
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Fig.2: Smart meters ring: keys updating – adapted from [10] 
V. HOW IT WORKS  
The process is begun when a SMi is connected to the grid 
for the first time and must receive a license from the ES. The 
SM in question sends an Enabling Request in the Grid to the 
ES via data which identify it. At the ES, the data of this SM are 
verified and if they are correctly registered, the ES sends back a 
license allowing it to continue the process. Next, the SM sends 
a message via Broadcast to the LC. If there is on response from 
the LC after a pre-determined number of attempts the SM will 
assume the role of LC. If an LC already exists in the group it 
will respond to the SM with a Token value which will identify 
it to the group. This Token is not related to the SM identifier 
with the ES. This Token value (Ti)is also sent to the ES. The 
Token's role is to identify the SM with the ES only for 
obtaining the group's instant consumption.  
When the SMi receives the Ti , it responds to the LC with 
the encryption key value ki1, which in turn responds by 
sending the identification of its successor Sciwithin the 
previously described virtual ring. After a previously 
determined interval of time, the LC processes the values ki1to 
arrive at the value K as shown in (4).  
𝐾 =  𝑘𝑖1
𝑛
𝑖=1  (4) 
Once the K value has been calculated, the LC sends the K, n 
andTi  values to the ES, where n is the number of SMs present 
in the virtual ring. Whenever the network's topography 
changes, the process is repeated. The LC role is traded at 
random between the members of the group at random intervals. 
If the LC is the SMm , then its successor will be the SMm+1and 
its predecessor the SMm−1. 
The ES will begin the reading of instant consumption 
through a request made directly to the LC, which sends the 
value δm,j to its successor. The smart meter SMm+1sends the 
values Tm+1 ,  and  Ekm +1,j em+1,j to the ES and the 
valueδm+1,jto SMm+2, its successor. 
The values are sent from one member of the ring to the next 
until returning to SMmwhich only then will send the encrypted 
consumption value.  
After receiving the last value Ek1j e1j the ES will obtain 
the entire group's consumption value through the equations 
shown in (5). 
⨂𝑖=1
𝑛 𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗  𝑒𝑖𝑗  =  𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗  𝑒𝑖𝑗  
𝑛
𝑖=1 =   𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑘𝑖𝑗  =
𝑛
𝑖=1
 𝑖=1𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑗+𝑖=1𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑗=𝐸𝐾⨁𝑖=1𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑗 (5) 
And:  
 ⨂𝑖=1
𝑛 𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗  𝑒𝑖𝑗  =  𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝐾 (6) 
The decryption function performed by the ES is given by 
(7). 
𝐷𝐾  𝐸𝐾 ⨁𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑒𝑖𝑗   = 𝐷𝐾  ⨂𝑖=1
𝑛 𝐸𝑘𝑖𝑗  𝑒𝑖𝑗    
 
= 𝐷𝐾  𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝐾  (7) 
 
Where K was sent by the LC and the values Ekij  eij  by the 
SMs. Thus, when K it is subtracted from (7) the group's instant 
consumption value is obtained ( eij
n
i=1 ).The model for this 
procedure is shown in Fig.3. 
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Fig.3: Proposed architecture 
So when the ES makes a request for readings of instant 
values, it determines how long it will wait for the readings to 
be finished, in other words, it waits for an interval of time for 
theall SMs respond. When this interval is over, the ES will 
process the received data.  
Supposing that the SMihad one fault in its data link, then 
the virtual ring won't complete its cycle. The LC will be able to 
identify this error and restart the process, sending a request to 
all the SMs so they re-register with the LC, therefore isolating 
SMi. When the error is fixed, the SMiwill emit a request for 
license to the LC.  
In the case thatSMi is the LC itself, the ES may be able to 
partially receive the readings but it will not receive the readings 
from SMi. To resolve this problem, the ES determines an 
interval of time for receiving data. If by the end of this time 
interval one SM has failed to respond, the readings are not 
validated and the ES waits for the process to restart.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Transmission of instant energy consumption measurements 
from consumer units is carried out via a secure channel, 
guaranteeing the integrity and authenticity of the data 
transmitted. The data confidentiality question is resolved by the 
process itself. The Electricity Supplier (ES) receives the 
consumption data through an identifier that only the Local 
Concentrator (LC) knows, unlike readings for billing in which 
the ES must know the identity of each consumer unit. The 
rotation of the LC position also guarantees security as it 
unables outsiders to obtain data, which is key-encrypted and 
unreadable without the key, which is changed with every 
reading.  
The Privacy-enhanced architecture for smart metering 
presented by [10], upon which this study is based, does not 
describe management of the Local Concentrator's functions and 
the dispatch of the keys between the consumer units belonging 
to the interest group. This brought about a proposal for an 
additional, improved mechanism for managing LC functions 
and the exchanges of messages between the Electricity 
Supplier and the Smart Meters, as well as the dispatch of the 
differential iterative encryption keybetween them as a 
guarantee of consumer privacy security.  
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